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No national history has a richer mosaic of political traditions than France’s.
Anyone studying modern France encounters a broad spectrum of political ideolo-
gies including monarchism – of both legitimist and Orléanist strains –
Bonapartism, Gaullism, fascism, republicanism, liberalism, socialism, communism,
and anarchism. In turn, each tradition possesses its own wealth of political sym-
bols, conventions, and beliefs. Moreover, in France today many of these traditions
continue to bear considerable weight. On the far left, the French Communist
Party, though diminished, remains a force to be reckoned with, while the right-
wing extremist Front National still has a lamentable impact on political discourse.
Gaullism, meanwhile, continues to dominate French conservatism, as Gaullists
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join forces with the Socialist Party to decry the influence of “Anglo” liberalism
against the backdrop of the global recession.
Unsurprisingly, given the vibrancy of contemporary French politics,
there is a voluminous historiography on the country’s political history in both
English and French (not to mention other European languages). Equally pre-
dictable is that much of this historiography is itself influenced by the aforemen-
tioned political traditions. Historians of France have often written within partic-
ular political schools and for specific political purposes. For instance, recall Jules
Michelet, the great historian of the revolution, who wrote within a republican tra-
dition with the express purpose of discrediting first the July Monarchy and then
the Second Empire,1 or Marc Bloch, whose call for historians to remain political-
ly engaged was written during the German occupation (the book was published
posthumously as Bloch was executed for his resistance activities)2 or the monar-
chist Jacques Bainville whose work was dominated by two obsessions he shared
with much of the far right during the interwar period: a hatred of the Third
Republic and an intense Germanophobia.3 In short, French historians of all per-
suasions have a longstanding habit of writing as intellectuels engagés, and have to
some degree eschewed the German and Anglo pursuit of apolitical objectivity
accordingly.
Recent contributions to French political history confirm this remains the
case. Though the works surveyed here are chiefly authored by Anglophone schol-
ars, each tackles politicized material from particular political and historiographical
positions. In so doing, they enliven French historiography and make it politically
relevant in the present.
It seems appropriate to begin with the French Revolution. In addition to
the Revolution spawning a vast literature exploring its origins, course, and effects,
the traditions it inspired have also received their due attention.4 In The Bourgeois
Revolution in France, 1789-1815, Henry Heller tackles the Revolution anew. This
book has received some truly unflattering reviews5 in large part because of its his-
toriographical position, which is determined by Heller’s politics. Heller is an unre-
pentant Marxist in a field he correctly identifies as dominated by, in his words, “so-
called revisionist historians” (Heller, 2). These scholars, the departed François
Furet chief among them, adopt an approach that we might broadly term post-
structuralist, but in truth they are a much more diverse bunch than Heller allows.
His dismissive tone towards revisionist historiography is unwarranted and derives
from Heller’s conviction that their position is “a form of historical irrationality
that is rooted in political and social conservatism” (Heller, 150). As a Marxist,
Heller wants to return the interpretive emphasis to social and economic factors. In
particular, he resurrects the classic Marxist argument that the Revolution resulted
from France’s transition to industrial capitalism. In so doing, he traces the emer-
gence of capitalism in the eighteenth century French countryside, as well as the
development of a French middle class (Heller, 27-64), and argues thereafter that
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the middle class abandoned the ancien regime because the monarchy no longer ade-
quately promoted or protected its interests. (Heller, 83-108)
The book’s injudicious tone is unfortunate and helps explain its hostile
reception. Heller seems determined to set up revisionist historians as straw men
in order to knock them down. In so doing he overstates both his own case, and
the degree to which revisionism has become the new orthodoxy. Heller writes as
though structural changes to the economy are now completely ignored in the
wider literature. Surely, the majority of undergraduate lectures on the French
Revolution, the truest measure of an orthodoxy’s sway, discuss the rise of peasant
unrest and proto-capitalist relations in both town and country. Indeed, in this
respect, the Marxist interpretation of Albert Soboul and others has shown remark-
able resiliency.6 Perhaps Heller need not fret quite so much.
Despite its flaws, however, The Bourgeois Revolution in France is a worth-
while read. It would work very well in a seminar on the causes of the French
Revolution opposite, for example, Sarah Maza’s The Myth of the French Bourgeoisie.7
At 150 pages of text, Heller’s work succinctly reiterates the Marxist interpretation
while incorporating some of the insights of revisionism. Moreover, his argumen-
tative tone would encourage spirited discussion in the classroom. Certainly, his
book is a stellar example of the influence of political traditions on historical writ-
ing.
Another well-known Marxist historian of France is Herman Lebovics.
He is the author of such works as The Alliance of Iron and Wheat in the Third French
Republic and True France: The Wars over Cultural Identity, and is widely regarded as one
of the premier scholars of the Third Republican period.8 Indeed, Lebovics is suf-
ficiently well-respected that he has been able to publish a book of essays,
Imperialism and the Corruption of Democracies with Duke University Press. In this
book, which encompasses British as well as French imperial history, Lebovics’
Marxism is not as front and centre as Heller’s. His didactic purpose in writing the
book, however, is obvious: to oppose the neo-imperialism of the Bush adminis-
tration in the United States, in power at the time of his publication. Lebovics
draws on diverse material including the films of Jean Renoir and the political phi-
losophy of John Locke to argue that imperialism necessarily corrupts the imperi-
alist just as it subjugates its victims (Lebovics, 24-59; 87-99). This, Lebovics main-
tains, is particularly harmful to democracies, for, “[the] inevitable inequalities of
e m p i re destroy the integrat ive spirit on wh i ch democracies are fo u n d e d ”
(Lebovics, 117).
Feminists might quibble with Lebovics’ claim about the integrative spirit
of democracies given the frequent and deliberate exclusion of women (among
others) from the franchise, but his argument is appealing nonetheless. The best
essays in the collection are those where Lebovics is on familiar ground, dealing
with modern French cultural and colonial history. Perhaps the essay that most
effectively makes his point about the corrupting influence of imperialism is the
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first one, entitled, “Not the Right Stuff: Shrinking Colonial Administrators.”
Examining George Orwell’s “Shooting an Elephant” Raymond Gauthereau’s bas-
tardization of Orwell’s piece, and the Director of France’s École Coloniale, Robert
Delavignette’s theorizing on effective colonial rule, Lebovics explores how colo-
nial rulers must show mastery and strength above all else, leading them to commit
acts they know are unjust like shooting Orwell’s elephant (was Harry Whittington
the elephant to Dick Cheney’s Orwell?). Moreover, good colonial administrators,
according to Delavignette, were those who followed orders unquestioningly and
enforced colonial policy without empathy for colonial subjects. As Lebovics
implies, such people did not make conscientious citizens or particularly convinced
democrats (Lebovics, 1-21). This is a lesson he clearly feels that US policymakers
need to absorb.
There is no arguing with Lebovics’ sentiment. Yet, his thesis raises a
question he leaves unanswered: if imperialism is so corrosive to democracies, then
why were Europe’s two democratic stalwarts, Britain and France, also its greatest
imperial powers?  Indeed, one could argue that imperialism accompanied the
democratization of both Britain and France, particularly during the age of the
New Imperialism. The Third Republic, still France’s most enduring democratic
regime, came to life in 1870; the Second Reform Act in Britain, which enfranchised
working-class males, was passed in 1867; the New Imperialism including the
Scramble for Africa followed in the late-1870s through to World War One.
Perhaps imperialism was integral to or even a product of democracy, corrupting
though it may have been?
If all agree that France has a robust imperial tradition, there is less con-
sensus regarding the strength of its fascist inclinations. Crudely put, within France
the historiography has been dominated by the “immunity thesis”, which contends
that France had no significant indigenous fascist movements. The logic follows,
therefore, that Vichy and its crimes were an aberration, wrought by foreign con-
quest and the alien influence of Nazism. This position has been forwarded most
forcefully by René Rémond.9 Anglophone scholars have long been the chief
opponents of this view, beginning with Robert Paxton’s seminal examination of
Vichy. Such studies emphasize that while Vichy was certainly the product of the
German invasion and therefore by no means inevitable, it did have significant
roots in France, most notably in interwar French politics.10 Sean Kennedy’s new
book, based on his doctoral dissertation (though the additions to the book manu-
script are impressive), Reconciling France against Democracy: The Croix de Feu and the
Parti Social Français, 1927-1945 stands firmly in this tradition. This is perhaps
unsurprising given that Kennedy’s dissertation supervisor, William D. Irvine, has
published widely on the interwar right and indeed, has produced an influential arti-
cle on the Croix de Feu itself.11 The Croix de Feu, which was forced to change its
name to the Parti Social Français in 1936 when the French government declared it
an illegal organization, lies at the crux of the debate on the interwar French far
Review Essay 91
Left History 14_1-b - Quark Final  12/4/09  1:06 PM  Page 91
right because of its size – 1 to 1.2 million members by 1938 – and relative longevi-
ty (Kennedy, 194). In other words, if the Croix de Feu was a fascist or authoritar-
ian movement, then Vichy was less of an aberration then Rémond and others
would have us believe. Accordingly, Rémond characterized the movement as con-
servative and republican, a finding recently echoed by Albert Kéchichian (though
with some significant provisos).12
Kennedy’s book is impressive and, for Anglophone historians at least,
should prove the definitive word on the Croix de Feu for some time. His meticu-
lous research leaves no stone unturned, as he painstakingly reconstructs machina-
tions among the league’s leadership in combination with developments in the local
sections, including in Algeria. Kennedy’s conclusion that the movement was
“determined to endow France with an authoritarian nationalist state,” seems
incontrovertible given the weight of his evidence (Kennedy, 158). He pays partic-
ular attention to the multitude of ancillary organizations that the Croix de Feu and
Parti Social Français generated, arguing that the organization was constructing a
“counter-society” meant to embody the true, exclusionary France (Kennedy, 13).
Kennedy concludes, moreover, that the party went on to play an ambiguous role
at best in Vichy France, essentially hoping to outdo the Vichyites in their enthusi-
asm for Marshal Philippe Pétain’s “National Revolution” (Kennedy, 225-258).
Particularly damaging to the Croix de Feu’s defenders are Kennedy’s remarks on
anti-Semitism. He unearths new material showing even the movement’s leader,
Colonel François De La Rocque, an erstwhile opponent of biological racism, mak-
ing vilely anti-Semitic remarks and approving of Vichy’s anti-Semitic legislation
(See, for example: Kennedy, 238-239). In combination with Samuel Kalman’s
recent work on anti-Semitism in the Croix de Feu and Faisceau, particularly in
Algeria, it seems more than fair to label the movement an anti-Semitic one.13
While Kennedy forcefully maintains the Croix de Feu’s authoritarian
character, he argues that the movement is best understood as “nationalist author-
itarian” rather than fascist. In so doing, he departs from Irvine and takes a posi-
tion closer to that of the most prominent French opponent of the immunity the-
sis, Michel Dobry.14 Without offering his own definition of fascism, Kennedy out-
lines his reasons for defining the Croix de Feu as non-fascist in chapter 3. He
makes the salient observation that while the movement was certainly militaristic, it
did not promote imperial expansion or have the radicalizing elements of Nazism
and, to a lesser degree, Italian Fascism typically fueled by such expansion
(Kennedy, 115). Less convincing is Kennedy’s point that the Croix de Feu did not
set out to construct a “new man” as did other fascist movements. To support this
contention, Kennedy points to the general, though not total, absence of discus-
sions of the new man in the party’s rhetoric and among the movement’s leaders
(Kennedy, 117). As I have argued elsewhere, however, the militarization of poli-
tics and leisure that the Croix de Feu promoted combined with its clear interest in
sculpting robust masculine physiques suggests a project to construct a new man.
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Indeed, the Croix de Feu’s actions spoke louder than its words.15 But whether one
identifies the movement as fascist or not really depends on one’s definition of fas-
cism. And Kennedy suggests arguing over the fascist label is beside the point:
“Arguing that the Croix de Feu is better understood as authoritarian than as fascist
should not be equated with implying that it was somehow moderate” (Kennedy,
119).
Kennedy observes that Bonapartism was crucial to the far right’s evolu-
tion in the late nineteenth century (Kennedy, 17). This particular political tradition
began, obviously, with Napoleon Bonaparte, the subject of a new edited collection
from Campus/Verlag entitled, Women against Napoleon: Historical and Fictional
Responses to his Rise and Legacy. This volume offers fourteen essays exploring how
different women opposed the little Emperor in one way or another. The women
examined range from conservative monarchs, such as Naples’ Maria Carolina, to
nationalist poets such as Gertrud Kolmar (Maierhofer et al., 58-78, 281-299).
Some of these contributions are very good and enjoyable reads. For instance,
Dorothy Potter’s essay on Désirée Clary, a middle-class woman from Marseille
who was betrothed to Napoleon before he abandoned her for the widely-despised
Josephine de Beauharnais, displays a remarkable woman who used her charms,
intelligence, and continuing influence over the Emperor to not only survive tumul-
tuous times but to finagle her way onto the Swedish throne (Maierhofer et al., 79-
92). Clary, in essence, was able to manipulate her gendered position to her advan-
tage.
These essays’ authors write within their own traditions, of course, most
notably feminism and deconstructionism. One suspects they are hostile to the
infamously sexist Napoleon, and to the political legacy he inspired. Gertrud
Maierhofer, one of the editors, remarks that the objectives of collection are to
broaden the scholarship on literary representation and to contribute to the grow-
ing research on gender and military history (Maierhoer et al, 14). In the first, the
volume is an unequivocal success as most if its essays focus on women writers
attacking Napoleon or seeking to undermine his rule or legacy in their work. The
essays are generally engaging, cogent, and insightful, and certainly demonstrate
their subjects’ agency while remaining attentive to the restrictions imposed on
them by predominating conceptions of gender. Less clear, is how this work con-
tributes to the gendering of military history. There are some observations offered,
as in Caroline Bland’s essay about the author Louise François, on how gender
shaped authors’ telling and understanding of Napoleonic history, but no discus-
sion of military history per se (Maierhofer et al, 223-245). Historians searching for
scholarship gendering the Napoleonic wars should consult the work of Karen
Hagemann, whom Maierhofer cites in her introduction16 (Maierhofer et al, 14).
Laura Frader writes in a tradition somewhat similar to the authors in
Women against Napoleon. Like them, she is a feminist and a deconstructionist, but
she is also a well-published historian of the French labour movement.17 Her new
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book, Breadwinners and Citizens: Gender in the Making of the French Social Model, builds
on her existing expertise and points to the centrality of the breadwinner ideal to
French unionists, employers, and politicians, and ultimately to the French welfare
state. Gender scholarship, while now common in the Anglophone world’s nation-
al histories, remains underexplored in the French case, and thus, this work is a wel-
come and timely addition. Frader’s knowledge of her subject is encyclopedic, even
intimidating. She has a sophisticated understanding of gender, and seems entire-
ly at ease discussing the politics of France’s many unions, governments, and pro-
natalist lobby groups. Frader’s treatment on the impact of scientific management
in the workplace and the many ways in which it was gendered is especially enlight-
ening (Frader, 139-168). Additionally, throughout the book she pays creditable
attention to the intersection of race and gender, illustrating how and why women
and immigrant workers usually came to be ghettoized in reputedly “unskilled” jobs
and denied the full benefits of “economic citizenship” (see for example: Frader,
109-111, 169).
If there is anything to criticize about this outstanding book, it is its neg-
lect of the burden of gender for men. Although, it is true white French men ben-
efited economically from the breadwinner ideal while women were simultaneous-
ly disadvantaged, the breadwinner ideal also imposed unrealistic expectations on
men. Men were expected to work, to provide for their families, and accordingly,
to be “responsible.” Those men, particularly working-class men, who failed to live
up to these expectations, as they frequently did given their wages generally failed
to keep pace with inflation in the interwar period (Frader, 196), must have been
plagued by feelings of inadequacy. Frader hints at this on occasion, but does not
extrapolate (Frader, 185). What of those men who did not conform to the het-
erosexual trope of the male breadwinner?  What ramifications did this social
model have for homosexuals?
Much like Frader, Paul Jankowski is another Anglophone scholar of early
twentieth-century France. His book on the political boss of Marseille, for exam-
ple, explores the strange paths that pragmatists and opportunists took en route to
collaboration under Vichy.18 Perhaps it was this earlier work on such cynical char-
acters that led Jankowski to his interest in political scandals, beginning with his
masterful book on the “Stavisky Affair” of 1933-1934.19 France has a long histo-
ry of “affairs”, as the French call them, and it is this tradition that Jankowski makes
the subject of his new book, Shades of Indignation: Political Scandals in France, Past and
Present. The book’s range is impressive, stretching from early modern France to
the present. Its material is hugely promising, inviting comparisons between histor-
ical contexts, mentalities, regimes, and political traditions. Moreover, given his
Stavisky book, Jankowski seems the perfect historian for such an ambitious under-
taking.
Alas, despite its enormous promise the book is largely disappointing.
Jankowski chooses to organize it thematically around three axes: treason, corrup-
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tion, and injustice. This does allow him to offer some interesting insights into the
evolution of these concepts across centuries. He notes, in particular, that the most
scandalizing crimes prior to 1789 were those against the monarch, while in the pre-
World War Two era crimes against the nation or group drew the greatest outrage,
and now, beginning in the 1960s, it is crimes against the individual committed by
the state that most inflame French public opinion. In a sense then, the book is
about the rise of the nation state and its subsequent retreat “from grandeur to
humility” (Jankowski, 182). These are provocative observations, but unfortunate-
ly they are not well packaged. The author presumes a great degree of knowledge
on the part of his readers and hurries through scandal after scandal with limited
explanation. Even the Dreyfus Affair, the most infamous example of the arbitrari-
ness of justice in French history, is referenced many times but never explained (See
for example: Jankowski, 141-143). The book, in short, would have benefited from
fewer examples and more in depth discussion of individual cases. The general lack
of clarity is only partly rectified by an appendix of the scandals the author refer-
ences at the back of the book, particularly as the annotations are rather Spartan.
The Dreyfus Affair, for instance, is explained in a short paragraph. A reader who
did not already understand the nuances of Dreyfusardism and anti-Dreyfusardism
would remain hopelessly confused (Jankowski, 185-204).
To this point, this essay has concentrated on Anglophone historians of
France. It seems fitting, therefore, to give the last word to a French national,
Pierre Rosanvallon. Rosanvallon’s book, The Demands of Liberty: Civil Society in
France since the Revolution is itself, in some respects, an examination of political tra-
ditions.20 Rosanvallon is a scholar who invites reflection on political traditions. He
holds a Chair at the Collège de France, one of France’s most prestigious institutions,
which boasts such luminaries as Roland Barthes, Henri Bergson, and Michel
Foucault among its former faculty.21 He is a former collaborator of François
Furet’s, and is no doubt influenced by the historiographical tradition he inspired.22
Rosanvallon is, in other words, very much part of the French intellectual elite, the
kind of person the French take seriously in a way North Americans simply do not.
If Jankowski sees French society as increasingly polarized, Rosanvallon is
interested in the development of a “political culture of generality” (Rosanvallon,
4). In this book he seeks to examine the tensions between “civil democracy” and
“political democracy” since the French Revolution. Rosanvallon also draws on the
long tradition of politically engaged French academics when he expresses the hope
that his study will prove applicable to the present and foster better relations
between civil society and the state (Rosanvallon, 1-3). Few Anglophone historians
would be so explicit. Rosanvallon’s argument is that as French Revolutionaries
proclaimed the Republic the expression of the general will, they could not toler-
ate competing associations in civil society that suggested a fragmentation of the
nation. To allow such organized dissent would be to admit the imaginary charac-
ter of the revolutionaries’ “utopian generality” (Rosanvallon, 11-76). Thus,
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Rosanvallon maintains, political associations were routinely suppressed following
the revolution. The turning point came on 21 March 1884 when the Third
Republic granted legal recognition to unions, thereby both allowing competition
with the state for workers’ loyalties, and admitting the existence of an alternate
vision of the country (Rosanvallon, 168-185). Although this legislation opened
the door somewhat, the virulent anti-clericalism of radical republicans towards the
end of the nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth was evidence,
Rosanvallon maintains, of republicans’ continuing intolerance for deviance from
their understanding of the general will. The author concludes, however, that the
postwar period witnessed a growing acceptance of associational life and increas-
ing state involvement in it. By 1995, 58% of associations’ funding came from the
public purse (Rosanvallon, 257). Rosanvallon’s story is thus diametrically opposed
to Jankowski’s. He emphasizes a growing inclusivity that in fact fosters group
unity as opposed to the atomization that Jankowski appears to lament. This is a
thought-provoking and sweeping analysis, which, if it makes some missteps along
the way, like misidentifying Georges Valois as a backward-looking anti-modernist
(Rosanvallon, 251) when by the most recent account he was, in fact, a modernist
who foresaw the consumerist society,23 than this is forgivable.
In conclusion, the works surveyed here are lively and engaging. This is a
result, in no small part, of the intersection of the political and historiographical
traditions they uncover and perpetuate. Writing from Marxist, feminist, and other
vantage points, these historians expose the dynamism of French political history,
which remains capable of sparking curiosity, passion, and vigorous debate.
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